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Abstract 
The task of this work is to apply thoughts from Georg Lukács’ final book, the 
Ontology of Social Being, for the theoretical analysis of cultural and digital labour. It 
discusses Lukács’ concepts of work and communication and relates them to the 
analysis of cultural and digital work. It also analyses his conception of the relation of 
labour and ideology and points out how we can make use of it for critically 
understanding social media ideologies. Lukács opposes the dualist separation of the 
realms of work and ideas. He introduces in this context the notion of teleological 
positing that allows us to better understand cultural and digital labour as well as 
associated ideologies, such as the engaging/connecting/sharing-ideology, today. The 
analysis shows that Lukács’ Ontology is in the age of Facebook, YouTube, and 
Twitter still a very relevant book, although it has thus far not received the attention 
that it deserves. This article also introduces the Ontology’s main ideas on work and 
culture, which is important because large parts of the book have not been translated 
from the German original into English. Lukács’ notion of teleological positing is 
crucial for understanding the common features of the economy and culture. 
 
Keywords: Georg Lukács, Ontology of Social Being, work, labour, culture, 
communication, ideology, cultural work, digital labour, engaging/connecting/sharing 
ideology, Internet, social media  
 
Corresponding author: 
Christian Fuchs, Communication and Media Research Institute, University of 
Westminster, Watford Road, Northwick Park, HA1 3TP, UK Email: 
c.fuchs@westminster.ac.uk, @fuchschristian 
 
Christian Fuchs is professor at the University of Westminster’s Communication and 
Media Research Institute. He is editor of the journal tripleC: Communication, 
Capitalism & Critique and author of books such as Culture and Economy in the Age 
of Social Media and Digital Labour and Karl Marx. 
 
<2:> 1. Introduction 
 
The task of this work is to apply thoughts from Georg Lukács’ final book, the 
Ontology of Social Being, for the analysis of cultural and digital labour. Section 2 
discusses Lukács’ concept of work and communication and relates them to the 
analysis of cultural and digital work. Section 3 focuses on his analysis of labour and 
ideology and points out how we can make use of it for the critical understanding of 
social media ideologies. Section 4 draws some conclusions. This article also 
introduces the Ontology’s main ideas on work and culture, which is important because 
large parts of the book have not been translated from the German original into 
English.  
Georg Lukács was one of the 20th century’s most well known Marxist 
philosophers. His book History and Class Consciousnes: Studies in Marxist 
Dialectics (Lukács, 1923/1971) is among the most influential studies of the proletariat 
and reified consciousness. History and Class Consciousness focuses on the analysis 
of class-consciousness, ideology, and reification. Labour is a strongly subordinated 
and rather neglected topic in the book. Language and communication play almost no 
role in it. In a preface written for the new 1967 edition, Lukács (1923/1971: xvii) 
acknowledges the neglect of labour in the book: ‘It is true that the attempt is made to 
explain all ideological phenomena by reference to their basis in economics but, 
despite this, the purview of economics is narrowed down because its basic Marxist 
category, labour as the mediator of the metabolic interaction between society and 
nature, is missing’. 
The Ontology in contrast is a theory of society and capitalism and is therefore 
much more concerned with the relationship between work and culture as well as that 
between labour and ideology. It also gives attention to communication and language, 
which makes it particularly interesting for reflections from a media and 
communications perspective. In the reception of Lukács’ works, there has been a very 
strong focus on History and Class Consciousness, overlooking that he also wrote 
other important works, such as the Ontology of Social Being. This also becomes 
evident in more recent publications on Lukács. 
Andrew Feenberg (2014: viii) argues in his book The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx, 
Lukács and the Frankfurt School that History and Class Consciousness is the ‘pivotal 
text of [the] philosophy of praxis’. He therefore focuses the entire book on this work 
and its relevance and does not mention the Ontology once. The book Georg Lukács: 
The Fundamental Dissonance of Existence (Bewes and Hall, 2011) is a collection of 
13 essays. They contain just one reference to the Ontology and 127 to History and 
Class Consciousness. The collected volume Georg Lukács Reconsidered (Thompson, 
2011) consists of 13 essays. They in total make 13 references to the Ontology and 
contain hundreds of references to and quotes from History and Class Consciousness. 
Chris Nineham’s (2010) Capitalism and Class Consciousness: The Ideas of Georg 
Lukács focuses on History and Class Consciousness and does not mention the 
Ontology.  
In the first volume of Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas (1984) 
devotes chapter IV to the topic From Lukács to Adorno: Rationalization as 
Reification. He shows the influence that Lukács had on the Frankfurt School and 
focuses his analysis <3:> on Lukács’ concept of reification in History and Class 
Consciousness. Habermas argues that Horkheimer and Adorno’s ‘critique of 
instrumental reason understands itself as a critique of reification that takes up Lukacs' 
Weber reception without accepting the implications of his objectivistic philosophy of 
history’ (Habermas, 1984: 366). Habermas’ criticised that Horkheimer and Adorno 
lack a theory of communicative rationality that negates instrumental rationality. In 
formulating this critique however, because of his pure focus on History and Class 
Consciousness and his neglect of the Ontology of Social Being, Habermas does not 
realise that the importance of communication in society can be grounded in Lukács’ 
works itself, which may be a better way for a critical theory than using concepts of 
communication that stem from bourgeois approaches such as John L. Austin and John 
Searle’s speech act theories and George Herbert Mead’s symbolic interactionism.  
The Ontology was written in the years 1964-1970 and was Lukács’ final work 
(Fehér et al., 1976). In his study of the Ontology, Nicolas Tertulian argues that 
Lukács’ aim in this work was ‘to reconstruct ontology as the fundamental discipline 
of philosophical reflexion’ (Tertulian, 1988: 247) and to work out ‘a really universal 
theory of the categories of existence’ (249). It is an extensive book comprising of 
1460 pages in total, separated into two volumes in the German edition (Lukács 1986a, 
1986b).. Some chapters of the Ontology have been translated into English and 
published in three parts on a total of 436 pages, which shows that large parts have 
remained thus far untranslated. The first part of the English edition focuses on Hegel 
(Lukács, 1978a), the second on Marx (Lukács, 1978b), and the third on labour 
(Lukács, 1978c). The second German volume (Lukács, 1986b) contains a part called 
Das Ideelle und die Ideologie (The Realm of Ideas and Ideology) that consists of three 
parts: Das Ideelle in der Ökonomie (The Role of the Ideal in the Economy), Zur 
Ontologie des ideellen Moments (Toward an Ontology of the Ideal Moment), and Das 
Problem der Ideologie (The Problem of Ideology). It also contains a section on work 
that has been translated (Lukács, 1978c). Given that there is both a focus on work and 
ideas in one volume, it is clear that the Ontology promises insights into the 
relationship of the economy and culture.  
Lukács’ doctoral students Ferenc Fehér, Ágnes Heller, György Markus, and 
Mihály Vajda (1976) published their notes on the Ontology, in which they formulated 
dissatisfaction with the work concerning concepts such as nature, objectification, 
reflection, value, freedom, and progress. They also note that it remained an unfinished 
work because Lukács, who only partly agreed with his students’ criticisms, died 
before he could carry out planned revisions. But overall, he was not convinced by his 
students’ remarks. Rather ‘at the end of his life, Lukács was persuaded that it was in 
his Ontology that he had furnished the essential and definitive form of his thought’ 
(Tertulian, 1988: 248). 
The analysis shows that the Ontology is largely ignored and has not been 
discussed. For a cultural-materialist perspective on society however, the work 
promises insights into the relationship of work on the one hand and communication 
and language on the other hand, as becomes evident when for example Titus Stahl 
(2013) in an encyclopaedia entry about Lukács writes about the Ontology: ‘From 
these ontological commitments, it follows that the existence of the social totality 
depends on the intentionality which guides individual acts of labor and vice versa […] 
Lukács therefore <4:> describes social phenomena – as language and institutions – as 
modifications and ‘mediations’ of the relations of the labor process. That is, they are 
media of ‘indirect’ teleological positing because they enable forms of action which do 
not directly modify nature, but which indirectly aspire to bring other persons to do 
so’. Language and communication in the Ontology are explained as part of the 
dialectics of society, in which work undergoes dialectical mediations. ‘The principal 
aim of the ontological-genetical method developed by Lukács in his last work is to 
show how, in beginning from the elementary act of work, social life constitutes itself 
as a tissue of objectifications of greater and greater complexity, as interhuman 
relations better and better articulated, thanks precisely to the relation of dialectical 
tension between the teleological-activity of individual subjects and the network of 
objective causal determinations’ (Tertulian, 1988: 258). 
 
2. Work and Communication 
 
Lukács starts the second German volume of the Ontology with a discussion of work’s 
ontology. He uses the German term Arbeit that has been translated into English as 
labour. The term labour goes back to the Latin word laborem that means hard work, 
pain, and trouble (Fuchs, 2015: 23-24). The German word Arbeit derives from the 
Germanic term arba, which means slave (ibid.). The English word work and the 
German term werken go back to the Indo-European term uerg (doing, acting) (ibid.). 
They have the connotative meaning of creating something that has artistic value. In 
contemporary language, the terms work and labour are often used interchangeably in 
English, and the German word Arbeit often stands for both work and labour. It is 
certainly not Lukács’ intention to assume that slavery and toil are features of all 
societies. In the discussion that follows, I therefore replace his usage of the term 
labour by ‘work’ where he speaks of anthropological features of the economy in 
society.  
Lukács defines work as ‘a relationship of interchange between man (society) and 
nature, and moreover with inorganic nature (tools, raw materials, object of labour) as 
well as organic’ (1978c: iv) and ‘the positing of a goal and its means’ (22), ‘the 
metabolism between man (society) and nature’ that is an ‘”eternal” form that persists 
through the change in social formations’ (39). Work ‘involves a process between 
human activity and nature: its acts are directed towards the transformation of natural 
objects into use-values’ (47). It is the ‘intervention into concrete causal relations in 
order to bring about the realization of the goal’ (67). 
Work is a ‘teleological positing’ that results in ‘the rise of a new objectivity’ (3). 
Work is teleological because in it, a ‘conscious creator’ (human beings) produces with 
a purpose, orientation and goal (5). So the human teleology that Lukács considers as 
being characteristic for work and therefore for society is not opposed to causality and 
is not an external, esoteric force that drives society to a higher goal (such as Hegel’s 
Weltgeist or in pre-Socratic Greek philosophy Anaxagoras’ nous), but is immanent in 
society itself, namely in human practice and consciousness. 
Lukács’ (1978c) examples are predominantly taken from agriculture and hunting. 
When describing concrete work processes, he speaks for instance of the selection of 
‘one <5:> stone out of a heap of stones’ as tool (31), of hunting (47), or the human use 
of fire (Lukács, 1986b: 34). In a materialist philosophy, there is nothing outside of 
matter and therefore nothing outside of nature. Humans and society are however 
different from non-human beings in that they can make conscious choices between 
alternatives and anticipate the potential effects of their behaviour, which enables 
morality. Work not only takes physical objects found in nature as its input, but also 
physical and non-physical objects created by humans. The tools of work are not just 
physical tools, but can also be information-processing technologies such as the 
computer. The products of work processes are not just physical goods, but also 
information, non-physical services, and social relations. With the development of 
scientific and technological progress, human work therefore has the tendency to 
distance itself from its close grounding in natural objects. One may therefore say that 
work is not just a process between humans and nature, but one between humans, 
nature and culture, in which humans create with the help of technologies physical, 
social, and informational use-values out of natural, industrial, and cultural objects.  
Lukács (1978c) was aware of this circumstance and therefore argued: ‘In the later 
and more developed forms of social practice, the effect on other people comes more 
to the fore, and ultimately – if only ultimately – this effect aims at the production of 
use-values’ (47). Work’s teleological positing has historically become more distanced 
from nature and has become ‘also designed to cause other men to carry out positings 
of this kind in their turn’ (128). This results in ‘man’s own behaviour, his own 
subjectivity, becoming the object of a teleological positing’ (128). ‘The decisive 
variations arise by the object and medium of realization in the teleological positings 
becoming ever more social. This does not mean, as we know, that the natural basis 
disappears, simply that the exclusive orientation to nature that characterizes work as 
we originally presupposed it is replaced by intentions that are objectively mixed in 
character, and become ever more strongly social’ (129). 
Lukács here argues that the social itself, such as relations, intentions, experiences 
and knowledge, in the course of society’s development has become more part of the 
objects, tools and products of work so that work has partly been distanced from its 
original natural basis, which however does not mean that information work 
substitutes, but rather complements agricultural, extractive and industrial work. 
Lukács distinguishes between two types of teleological positings: those that change 
nature and those that change the social (Lukács, 1986b: 136). The second would 
become the more important, the more work and co-operation develop (ibid.). They are 
expressions of ‘mental work’1 (ibid.).  
Society is for Lukács a totality consisting of over-grasping moments, i.e. systems 
that reach over into each other. It is a ‘complex of complexes’ (Lukács, 1986b: 155; 
see also 181) that help reproducing society (182). Language is one of these 
complexes. It is a subjective organ and objective medium that enables social 
reproduction so that the human species can continuously preserve itself by continuous 
change of subjective and objective moments (169). Language use and communication 
are for Lukács constitutive moments in the social reproduction of society. He does 
however, unlike Niklas <6:> Luhmann (1995), not assume that communication is a 
subject in itself that continuously produces further communications in an autopoietic 
manner, so that social systems and society in a self-referential manner reproduce 
themselves (see Fuchs, 2008: chapter 3). The problem of Luhmann’s approach is that 
he considers, in a functionalist manner, humans as outside observers of social 
systems, as sensors in the environment of social systems (Luhmann, 1995: 410). For 
Lukács, communication as a form of social reproduction in contrast depends on active 
human, social, languaging beings inside the systems that they reproduce through 
interaction with nature and interaction between themselves. 
Consciousness plays a crucial role in the ‘active and productive being of the 
positing of causal relationships’ (Lukács, 1978c: 31). That work is a conscious 
activity means that workers constantly make choices between behaviour alternatives, 
which results in a ‘chain of causality’ that in contrast to nature is not automatic, but 
consciously decided (33). The work process is ‘a chain of alternatives’ (33). If a 
programmer for example codes a piece of software, s/he must consciously decide 
which algorithm is used next, how it is implemented, which syntax elements are used, 
etc. in order to achieve the goal that the programme should fulfil. Consciousness 
enables ‘human self-control’ (45), ‘self-realization’, ‘self-founded being’, and ‘social 
being’ (46).  
Lukács (1986b: 478) argues that dualist consciousness and theories that draw a 
sharp distinction between the physical and the ideational reflect in an ideological 
manner society’s division of labour that has, since the emergence of slavery, instituted 
this division in the economy itself. One should however not forget that a similar 
separation is also immanent in patriarchy that institutes a gendered division between 
physical and social labour as well as in gerontocracy that is based on a generational 
division between labour and collective decision-making. Lukács opposes dualist 
ontologies of society with a dialectical ontology.  
For Lukács (1978c), work is the essential and foundational activity of humans and 
society that is the ground of other phenomena such as language (v). It is the ‘model 
for all social practice, all active social behaviour’ (46). Work ‘is the underlying and 
hence the simplest and most elementary form of those complexes whose dynamic 
interaction is what constitutes the specificity of social practice’ (59). There is an 
‘identity of identity and non-identity’ of work and other forms of human practice (59).  
Lukács considers teleological positing (the conscious and active production of 
changes by realising subjective intentions in the objective world) as a common feature 
of work and communication, i.e. the economy and culture. There is an ‘ontological 
similarity of base and superstructure as they are both based on teleological positings 
and their causal effects’2 (Lukács, 1986b: 424). In the economy, where work creates 
goods, the intentional goals tend to be much more clearly defined, whereas in culture, 
where communication influences social behaviour, there is much more scope for what 
is considered desirable and undesirable, for ‘reactions to societal matters of fact, 
situations, tasks, etc.’3 (Lukács 1986b: 417). Lukács says that in the economy, the 
value of a product depends on whether it is ‘immediately useful or non-useful, 
whereas in artistic creation the field and possibilities of value and non-value are 
extraordinarily widely stretched and hardly determinable in advance’4 (535). 
Teleological positing means that ideas are a guiding and goal-setting dimension of 
work so that culture is immanent in work itself. The human brain defines goals that 
are <7:> conditioned by economic and social needs and for realising them guides 
human activities. Culture however is not the same as the economy, but is a guiding 
feature of the economy that created by work goes beyond the economy and takes 
effect in the form of collective meanings all over society. Culture is simultaneously 
economic and non-economic.  
Lukács says that ideology is not the same as cultural work, but can emanate from 
it. In making this argument, he argues for a true dialectic of the culture and economy: 
he on the one hand sees all culture and ideology produced by work, i.e. there is an 
economic foundation of cultural work. Culture and ideology also take on an emergent 
quality that goes beyond the economy so that the meanings cultural work produces 
take effect all over society. This explains why Lukács speaks of the identity and non-
identity of work and culture. ‘Mental work is, also as a moment of society’s division 
of labour, by no means identical to ideology. Their connection is therefore very deep: 
The result of any mental work can turn into ideology in certain social situations, 
society’s division of labour constantly creates situations in which such turns become 
necessary and permanent’5 (Lukács, 1986b: 427). 
For Lukács, consciousness is not reality, but a form of objectivity that reproduces 
reality (1978c: 26). ‘Ontologically, social being divides into two heterogeneous 
moments, […] being and its reflection in consciousness’ (26). Human consciousness 
was ‘called into being in work, for work, and by work’ (52). There is no photographic 
copying of reality in consciousness, but reflection is ‘conditioned by the posited 
goals’ and ‘the social reproduction of life, originally by work’ (27). Consciousness 
and work have at the same time a relationship of ‘linkage and autonomy’ (52). So 
consciousness alone is not behaviour and work, but a foundation of both. 
Consciousness has an important role in society because it ‘sets goals’, masters the 
human body, and allows a ‘distanced and critical’ relationship of the person to him-
/herself and to others (109). ‘And the origin of this mastery lies undoubtedly in work’ 
(109).  
All work and action has an aspect of consciousness because before working and 
action, humans reflect what they want to achieve and how. Ideas and material changes 
of the world are therefore not independent, but inherently connected (Lukács, 1986b: 
297). Lukács criticises that theorists such as Georgi Plechanov, Karl Kautsky, Max 
Adler, and Stalin have separated the economy from the world of ideas in a dualist 
manner (298-99). He in this discussion points to the fact that human thought is not 
work itself, but one of its necessary preconditions and parts. Reflection precedes and 
enables both physical work that creates physical goods and mental work that creates 
informational use-values in society.  
Lukács argues that communication already exists in higher animals for the 
purposes of ‘danger, food, sexual desire, etc.’ (1978c: 100). Human language and 
communication would arise out of economic necessity when humans are required to 
say something to each other in order to master the rising complexity of the 
organisation of production. So for example hunting requires co-operation because it is 
a complex process, for which co-ordination is necessary. ‘Its [co-operation’s] mere 
existence, albeit on a low level, results in the emergence of another key determination 
of social being from work, the precise communication of humans united in work: 
language’6 (Lukács, 1986b, 118). Language enables teleological positings that have 
the intention to ‘encourage other <8:> people to conduct a teleological positing that is 
desired by the predicating subject’7 (Lukács, 1986b: 119). Language develops with 
the development of work, co-operation, and the division of work (119).  
Communication is based on the fact that the human is an ‘answering being’8 
(Lukács, 1986b: 339). An answer, however, presupposes a question. Humans have the 
capacity to find answers posed by nature and to ask questions about nature, 
themselves, and society. We can therefore say in expanding Lukács’ thought that 
communication is based on a dialectic of questioning and answering, in which a 
question produces answers, which produces further questions, and so on.  
Words that form a language are abstractions and generalisations of reality (Lukács, 
1986b: 346, 419). The description of a specific circumstance is concrete and therefore 
requires a complex linguistic combination of words (1986b: 346). Language enables 
the ‘distancing of the object from the subject’ (1978c: 100) and enables this 
distancing. ‘In this way what is depicted by the verbal sign is separated from the 
objects it describes, and hence also from the subject uttering it, becoming the mental 
expression for an entire group of particular phenomena, so that it can be applied in a 
similar way in completely different contexts and by completely different subjects’ 
(100). Human language allows the repetition and development of production 
processes in the same or different spaces at different times. Lukács at a high level of 
theoretical abstraction hints at the fact that the development of production 
technologies allows the spatio-temporal distancing of production, the development of 
transport and distribution technologies enables the spatio-temporal distancing of 
distribution, and the development of conservation and preservation technologies 
fosters the distancing of consumption. ‘In its further development, work constantly 
interposes whole series of mediations between man and the immediate goal which he 
is ultimately concerned to achieve. In this way, work gives rise to a differentiation 
between immediate and more mediated goal positings’ (101-102).  
The spatio-temporal distancing of production requires physical and linguistic 
technologies of production, distribution, and consumption. Communication is an 
important means of organising work and human activity in space-time and over 
spatio-temporal distances. ‘The mental distancing of objects by language only makes 
the real distancing that thus arises communicable, making possible its establishment 
as the common possession of a society’ (102). The storage of information enables the 
organisation of the economy and society over spatio-temporal distances and across 
generations. Society’s development is therefore connected to the development of 
information technologies that store and distribute information about human social 
relations. They include for example human memory, tradition, myths, art, writing, 
lists, timetables, the book, libraries, archives, schools, universities, newspapers, the 
telegraph, the telephone, the radio, the television, cinema, the database, computers, 
computer-mediated communication, the Internet, records, tapes, CDs, DVDs, Blu-ray 
discs, digital hard disks, servers, FTP, cloud storage, etc. (see Fuchs, 2003). 
<9:> 
 
Figure 1: A dialectical model of cultural work 
 
Language is a complex in society that mediates both the human metabolism with 
nature as well as the relations between humans in society (Lukács, 1986b: 18). It 
helps distancing human subjects from objects and from other subjects and at the same 
time helps to co-ordinate the production of new objects out of existing objects and the 
emergence and reproduction of social relations between humans.  
For Lukács, consciousness enables a form of freedom within necessity (Lukács 
1986b: 308), i.e. human choices between different actions based on conditions that are 
not self-chosen. Conscious human action opens up the world to chance and makes it 
to a certain degree undetermined and shapeable by humans. To illustrate this 
circumstance, Lukács (1986b: 304) quotes in this context Marx (1867: 208-9): ‘No 
one can sell unless someone else purchases. But no one directly needs to purchase 
because he has just sold’. If someone who has money chooses to buy or to save, what 
exactly s/he buys in the case of a purchase, and from whom, is not determined, but 
rather depends on an interaction of complex conditions and choices, the ‘mutual 
dialectical polarity of the ideal and the real’9 (Lukács, 1986b: 306). Market supply, 
local accessibility, wages and prices, class struggles, transport structures, etc. 
condition the possible choices that the potential purchaser makes based on his/her 
evaluation of these structures. The ideal moves the real, but it can only move ‘real 
possibilities of being-in-itself’10 (343). 
Based on Lukács’ idea that mental work creates culture that is simultaneously 
economic and transcends the economy, we can design a dialectical model of cultural 







































Using a stage model allows us to identify and relate different levels of cultural work 
(see figure 1). Cultural work is a term that encompasses organisational levels of work 
that are simultaneously distinct and dialectically connected: cultural work has an 
emergent quality, namely information work that creates content and is based on and 
grounded in physical cultural work, which creates information technologies through 
extractive and industrial work processes. Physical work takes place inside and outside 
of culture: it creates information technologies and its components (cultural physical 
work) as well as other products (non-cultural physical work) that do not primarily 
have symbolic functions in society (such as cars, toothbrushes or cups). Cars, 
toothbrushes, or cups do not <10:> primarily have the role of informing others or 
enabling communication with others, but rather help humans achieve the tasks of 
transport, cleanliness, and nutrition. Culture and information work however feed back 
on these products and create symbolic meanings used in contemporary society by 
companies for marketing them. Cultural work is a unity of physical cultural work and 
information work that interact with each other, are connected and at the same time 
distinct. 
All culture involves cultural work and effects of cultural products in society 
(meaning-making). The production and communication of meanings, social norms 
and morals are work processes: they create cultural use-values. Culture requires on 
the one hand human creativity for creating cultural content and on the other hand 
specific forms and media for storage and communication. The creation of information 
and communication through language is specific for work conducted in the cultural 
system: informational and communication work. For having social effects in society, 
humans with the help of information and communication technologies, such as 
computers, TV, radio, newspapers, books, recorded films, recorded music, language, 
etc., organise (i.e. store, process, transport, analyse, transform, create) information 
and communication. Physical cultural work produces information technologies. 
Culture encompasses a) physical cultural work that creates cultural technologies 
(information and communication technologies) and b) information work that creates 
information and communication. 
The term digital labour emerged for understanding value-creation on social media 
platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Weibo (see the contributions in 
Scholz, 2013). It would however be idealist to limit the notion of digital labour to the 
exploitation of users’ online activities by commercial platforms that use targeted 
advertising or to the creation of digital content that is sold as a commodity. The 
creation of digital content requires a technological infrastructure that is produced and 
maintained by labour processes (Fuchs, 2014, 2015). Digital labour is all paid and 
unpaid labour that helps creating digital technologies, content, and data that is sold as 
a commodity. It includes diverse activities such as slave-labour extracting minerals 
that form the physical foundation of information technologies, the labour of militarily 
controlled and highly exploited hardware assemblers who work under conditions of 
Taylorist industrialism, a highly paid knowledge labour aristocracy, precarious digital 
service workers as well as imperialistically exploited knowledge workers in 
developing countries, workers conducting the industrial recycling and management of 
e-waste, or highly hazardous informal physical e-waste labour (Fuchs, 2014, 2015). 
Such forms of digital labour form an international division of digital labour that 
creates the digital media industry’s profits (ibid.). Why is it important to have such a 
unified concept of digital labour? Nick Dyer-Witheford (2014: 175) provides an 
answer: ‘To name the global worker is to make a map; and a map is also a weapon’. 
Digital work is a specific organisational form of cultural work that creates digital 




Figure 2: A dialectical model of digital work 
 
Digital labour is alienated digital work: it is alienated from itself, from the 
instruments and objects of labour and from the products of labour. Digital labour is 
digital work that is organised within class relations. Figure 3 shows a model of the 
international division of digital labour. Each production step involves human subjects 
(S) using technologies/instruments of labour (T) on objects of labour (O) so that a 
product emerges. 
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Physical digital labour creates minerals and ICT components that are assembled into 
digital media technologies. It involves extractive and industrial digital labour. Digital 
information workers use this technological infrastructure in order to create digital 
contents and data that are sold as commodities. Physical and informational digital 
work can take place within various social relations of production, including slavery, 
freelance labour, wage labour, feminised labour, unpaid labour, etc. In the case that 
these relations are class relations, we speak of digital labour. In contrast, if we have to 
do with commons-based relations of production, in which there are no class relations  
but common <12:> property and common production, we merely speak of digital 
work. Digital work is a more general term than digital labour. All digital labour is 
digital work, but not all digital work is digital labour. Table 1 shows an overview of 
relations of production into which digital work can be embedded. It is based on a 
distinction between different forms of ownership (self-control, partly self-control and 
partly alien control, full alien control) 
 
 Owner of labour 
power 
Owner of the 
means of 
production 
Owner of the 
products of work 
Patriarchy Patriarch Patriarch Family 
Slavery Slave master Slave master Slave master 






Capitalism Worker Capitalist Capitalist 
Communism Self All Partly all, partly 
individual 
Table 1: The main forms of the relations of production in various modes of 
production 
 
Lukács’ Ontology is a general theory of society that draws attention to the importance 
of work, language, and communication in general. However, it is also an ontology of 
class society, in which he analyses the role of labour and ideology.  
 
3. Labour and Ideology 
 
We have seen in the previous section that for Lukács, cultural workers create culture, 
which means that also ideologies are created by labour, namely ideological labour. 
Lukács makes clear that not every cultural work creates ideology, but cultural 
products can turn into ideology if they serve dominative interests in class societies. 
Critiques of ideology such as Critical Discourse Analysis, often with the help of text 
and visual analysis, focus on uncovering the structure of ideologies, but neglect the 
working conditions under concrete humans and organisations create ideologies, 
whereas labour studies often focus on the study of working conditions and neglect 
how ideologies frame labour and capital (see: Fuchs, 2015: chapter 3). Lukács’ 
approach allows us to understand that labour and ideology are inherently connected: 
There is ideology-producing and -communicating labour – ideological labour – just 
like there are ideologies of and about labour. 
Lukács (1978c) argues that use-value can exist independently from exchange-value 
as ‘a product of work which man is able to make use of in the reproduction of his 
existence’ (v). With the rise of capitalism, use-value has however become the 
antagonist of exchange-value. ‘The more general the exchange-value, the clearer and 
more precisely socially necessary labour time comes into the limelight as the 
economic foundation of its respective quantity’11 (Lukács, 1986b: 124). Lukács says 
that ‘the division of labour mediated and brought about by exchange-value produces 
the principle of control by time by a better subjective use of it’ (1978c: 83). 
Exchange-value is a contradictory form that in capitalism ‘assumes the leading role in 
human social intercourse’ and therefore <13:> subsumes use-value, but at the same 
time ‘can only come to prevail by being based on use-value’ (87). 
Lukács (1986b: 635) argues that for Marx, reification and the alienation of humans 
and capitalist labour that results from it are connected to labour-time. Humans are 
reduced to a cog in the accumulation process that aims at creating as much profit per 
unit of time as possible: ‘Time is everything, man is nothing; he is, at the most, time's 
carcase. Quality no longer matters. Quantity alone decides everything; hour for hour, 
day for day’ (Marx, 1847: 127). The modern form of instrumental reason has its 
origin in the logic of quantification and the reduction of humans to instruments for 
quantitative increases of the ruling and owning elites’ power. The psychological 
reasons why humans reproduce ideologies would have to do with fear and hope 
(Lukács, 1986b: 643).  
Lukács connects the existence of ideologies as cultural phenomena to the existence 
of alienated labour in the economy. The reification of labour power necessitates 
ideologies that justify the existence of alienation. Ideologies attempt to alienate the 
human mind. They try to instrumentalise consciousness in the interest of dominant 
powers. Lukács (1986b: 397) is sceptical of Gramsci’s theory of ideology, in which 
ideologies are understood as individual worldviews. For Lukács, ideology in 
capitalism has its foundation in the masking of the subject by the object, for example 
the masking of surplus value produced in social relations as an expenditure of a 
specific amount of labour-time by monetary profit (Lukács, 1986b: 319-21). Ideology 
is made up of thoughts, practices, ideas, words, concepts, phrases, sentences, texts, 
belief systems, meanings, representations, artefacts, institutions, systems or 
combinations thereof that represent and justify one group’s or individual’s domination 
and power by misrepresenting, one-dimensionally presenting or distorting reality in 
symbolic representations. (Fuchs 2015: chapter 3). 
Ideology exists for Lukács (1986b) only where there are social struggles, i.e. in 
societies with antagonistic interests (398). They are ‘theoretical or practical vehicles 
for fighting out societal conflicts’12 (400). Ideology presupposes ‘societal structures, 
in which different groups and conflicting interests act and strive to impose their 
interest onto the totality of society as its general interest. To put it shortly: The 
emergence and diffusion of ideologies appears as the general characteristic of class 
societies’13 (Lukács, 1986b: 405). 
Lukács (1986b: 581) points out that commodity fetishism contains elements of 
religious ideology/alienation: Money and commodities appear as quasi-Gods. 
Religion is sublated in capitalist ideology. Religion is for Lukács the archetype of all 
ideological alienation (605). Lukács argues that the ontology of everyday life is the 
‘all-sided medium of immediacy’14 (556) that connects ideologies to the objective 
world of phenomena. In everyday life communication, humans get in touch with 
culture and ideologies.  
Lukács says that ideology has in capitalism since the rise of mass consumption in 
the 20th century taken on a transition from the power of not-having to the power of 
having: ‘In workers’ everyday life, the power of having does not appear as simple 
privation, as influence of not-having as the most important means for the necessary 
everyday satisfaction of needs on regular life, but in contrast as the power of direct 
having, as the race <14:> with other humans and groups in the attempt to raise 
personal prestige by the quantity and quality of having’15 (Lukács, 1986b: 699). 
Advertising plays a crucial role in this process:  
 
The effect on humans is primarily oriented on the belief that the purchase of 
particular hair tonics, ties, cigarettes, cars, etc., the visit to specific holiday  
resorts etc. results in one’s personality being truly acknowledged in one’s 
environment. The promotion of commodities as originally in ad promotion is 
not primary here, but rather the consumer’s personal prestige that shall be 
attained by purchasing. Underlying is a double tendency: on the one hand the 
intention to influence humans into a specific direction and to form them, on the 
other hand the intention to breed the particularity of humans, to enforce their 
perception that this superficial differentiation of particularity that has been 
purchased on the world market is the sole way of how humans become 
personalities, i.e. how they can achieve personal recognition16 (701). 
 
If we look at today’s media landscape, we can see that advertising plays a very 
important role in it (McKinsey, 2014). Lukács’ analysis that in the 20th century 
advertising has become one of the dominant forms of ideology in capitalism is even 
more true in the 21st century. On the World Wide Web, targeted advertising is the 
dominant capital accumulation model (Fuchs, 2014, 2015). Its introduction in 
the first decade of the 21st century has been accompanied by new ideologies that try to 
justify and legitimate capitalist Internet platforms.  
Internet companies are a first kind of actor that spread Internet ideologies. Here are 
some examples: 
• Facebook says it provides ‘the power to share and to make the world more open 
and connected’17.  
• YouTube conceives the essence of freedom as the possibility ‘to connect, inform 
and inspire others across the globe and acts as a distribution platform for original 
content creators and advertisers large and small’18.  
• For Twitter, the freedom of social media is ‘to connect with people, express 
yourself and discover what's happening’ and ‘give everyone the power to create 
and share ideas and information instantly’19.  
• Instagram says it is a ‘fast, beautiful and fun way to share your life with friends 
and family’20.  
• tumblr argues it enables you to ‘share the things you love’21. 
• Sina Weibo’s self-understanding22 is that it is a platform designed to ‘allow users 
to connect and share information anywhere, anytime and with anyone on our 
platform’ and provides ‘an array of online media and social networking services to 
our users to create a rich canvas for businesses and brand advertisers to connect 
and engage with their targeted audiences’.  
 
Not only do social media platforms’ marketing and PR departments advance the idea 
that social media is great because it allows engaging, connecting, and sharing (Fuchs, 
2015), but also some journalists and many consultants communicate such ideologies. 
They have business opportunities and capital accumulation in mind whenever they 
think of the Internet and are a second type of actor producing social media ideologies. 
Kevin Kelly (2009) for example argued in Wired magazine <15:> that social media 
enables sharing, cooperation, collaboration, and collectivism. He celebrates ‘the 
power of sharing, cooperation, collaboration, openness, free pricing, and 
transparency’. Marketing guru Gary Vaynerchuk (2011) writes that social media 
enables the emergence of a thank you economy, in which entrepreneurs create ‘a 
culture of caring’ (233), empower ‘people to be forthright, creative, and generous’, 
and allow ‘customers to help you shape your brand or business’ (233). Also 
celebratory cultural studies scholars have used similar language for the analysis of 
social media. Such scholars form a third type of ideologues producing social media 
ideologies. Henry Jenkins writes for example that ‘the Web has become a site of 
consumer participation’ (Jenkins, 2008: 137). 
Lukács has based his theory of ideology as reification on Marx’s concept of 
commodity fetishism, in which an object or something concrete (such as the 
commodity or money) masks the subject, the abstract, and social relations (for a 
detailed discussion of commodity fetishism from a media and communication studies 
perspective, see Fuchs 2016, chapter 1). The engaging/connecting/sharing-ideology is 
a special form of a reifying ideology, a form of inverted commodity fetishism: The 
users do not immediately experience the commodity on commercial social media as it 
is not immediately visible and experienced when logging into platforms without 
payment. This is different from buying a cinema, concert or circus ticket, where 
money directly mediates cultural experience. The commodification of data happens 
behind the users’ back. The social use-value of social media is immediately 
experienced and masks the commodity form. On targeted-advertising funded ‘free’ 
use platforms, the subject and the social masks the object and the commodity form. 
Inverted commodity fetishism conditions the emergence of the 
engaging/connecting/sharing ideology that in a populist manner appeals to users’ 
direct social experience and fetishises the social in order to mask the reality of 
commodification. The engaging/connecting/sharing ideology foregrounds and 
constantly stresses categories of non-instrumental, social, communicative reason such 
as caring, sharing, emotions, empowering, creativity, connecting, or making. This 
social dimension of online media in the contemporary capitalist Internet however 
serves instrumental reason, namely the accumulation of capital. The universe of use-
value and sociality has in the engaging/connecting/sharing ideology become 
subsumed under the logic of instrumental and technological reason that fosters capital 
accumulation in the interest of a particularistic capitalist class interest.  
How do users react to the engaging/connecting/sharing ideology? There are 
different possible responses of audiences, users, consumers, and citizens to 
ideologies. They can accept, resist, or partly accept and partly resist ideologies. This 
was the point of Stuart Hall’s (1973) encoding/decoding model. The problem of this 
model is that in a relativist manner, it conveys the impression that all three options are 
equally likely. The likelihood of specific audience responses is complex, having to do 
with factors such as time, education, skills, personal experiences, political 
worldviews, etc. In a capitalist society, audience responses therefore tend to be 
asymmetrically distributed. 
Empirical studies indicate that users do not simply reproduce the 
engaging/connecting/sharing ideology, but rather seem to be at the same time 
supportive of corporate social media’s social use-value dimension and sceptical of its 
exchange-value dimension and the commodification of personal data (Allmer et al., 
2014). They tend to have little knowledge about how the political economy of social 
media works and providing them with such information seems to empower them in 
being able to feel competent to make <16:> political and moral assessments of social 
media (ibid.). Internet users’ opinions towards social media are quite ambivalent and 
not automatically ideological. 
One important implication of Lukács’ Ontology is that ideologies are not free-
floating, independent structures, but are produced under specific working conditions 
by an ideological labour force. Concrete human beings and organisations create and 
reproduce the engaging/connecting/sharing ideology. 
B.J. Mendelson argues in his book Social Media is Bullshit that myths about the 
Internet that he based on what Harry G. Frankfurt (2005) calls ‘bullshit’ spread 
through an ‘asshole-based economy’ (Mendelson, 2012: 54) that cyber hipster, tech 
media and marketers, analysts, corporations, mainstream media and users advance 
(74). Mendelson draws on his own long experience as Internet consultant and 
concludes that you can only attain a lot of attention and visibility on social media if 
you are a powerful organisation investing a lot of money. He argues that advertising 
consultants tend to create the impression that social media is a great business 
opportunity for everyone in order to foster their own profit interests by selling the 
engaging/connecting/sharing ideology. Social media’s ideological workers include 
tech companies’ strategists, marketing gurus and consultants, neoliberal journalists, 




For Lukács, work understood as the active, conscious teleological positing of changes 
so that use-values are created in order to achieve goals is the foundation of humans 
and society. He opposes the dualist separation of the realms of work and ideas. 
Teleological positing – the conscious and active production of changes by realising 
subjective intentions in the objective world – is the common feature of the economy 
and culture. Teleological positing means that ideas are a guiding and goal-setting 
dimension of work so that culture is immanent in work itself. Lukács argues that 
mental work creates and communicates ideas as social use-values and is therefore a 
specific form of teleological positing.  
Lukács’ dialectical ontology of society can inspire us to think about the 
relationship between culture and economy. It provides an ontological foundation for 
conceiving cultural work as consisting of physical and informational cultural work 
that form a dialectic. Digital work is then a specific form of cultural work that creates 
digital media technologies, digital content, or digital data. It consists of physical and 
informational digital work that are interconnected and organised in the form of 
various social relations. In contemporary global capitalism, digital work takes on the 
form of an international division of digital labour.  
For Lukács, a specific form of cultural work – ideological labour – creates 
ideologies. In ideology, an object masks a subject. It is concrete humans and groups in 
specific labour processes and under particular working conditions, who produce and 
communicate ideologies. With the rise of advertising-financed social media platforms, 
a new form of ideology has emerged that justifies the capitalist Internet by 
foregrounding the social-use value these media enable in order to mask the 
commodification of data and the logic of capital accumulation. 
For Lukács, class struggle is an essential implication of Marxist theory that aims at 
overcoming alienation and reification. He argues with Marx that alienation can <17:> 
only be abolished through social struggles, which includes ideological struggles 
(1986b: 653). Alienation can ‘only be sublated by a fundamental economic-political-
social revolution of the whole system as general and objective mass phenomenon’23 
(698). The bottom line of the political economy of the contemporary landscape of 
cultural and digital labour is that we need political struggles for an alternative Internet 
and media that are re-designed within an alternative political and societal framework.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Translation from German: ‚geistige[n] Arbeit’ 
2 Translation from German: ‚ontologischen Gleichartigkeit von Basis und Überbau, daß sie nämlich 
beide auf teleologischen Setzungen und deren kausalen Folgen beruhen’. 
3 Translation from German: ‚Spielraum gewünschter (oder unerwünschter) Reaktionen auf 
gesellschaftliche Tatbestände, Situationen, Aufgaben etc.’ 
4 Translation from German: ‚daß auf je einer konkreten Produktionsstufe der Wert des Produkts der 
Arbeit sich scharf danach scheidet, ob es unmittelbar brauchbar oder unbrauchbar ist, während im 
künstlerischen Schaffen das Feld, die Möglichkeit von Wert oder Unwert außerordentlich weit 
gestreckt, im voraus kaum bestimmbar ist’. 
5 Translation from German: ‚geistige Arbeit ist, auch als Moment der gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsteilung, 
keineswegs mit Ideologie identisch. Ihre Verknüpftheit ist aber eben deshalb sehr innig: das Ergebnis 
jeder geistigen Arbeit kann in bestimmten sozialen Situationen in Ideologie umschlagen, ja die 
gesellschaftliche Arbeitsteilung bringt ununterbrochen Situationen hervor, in denen dieses Umschlagen 
notwendig und permanent wird’. 
6 Translation from German: ‚Ihre bloße Existenz, wenn auch auf noch so niedrigem Niveau, läßt eine 
weitere entscheidende Bestimmung des gesellschaftlichen Seins aus der Arbeit herauswachsen, die 
präzise Kommunikation zwischen den zu einer Arbeit vereinten Menschen: die Sprache’. 
7 Translation from German: ‚die Intention haben, andere Menschen dazu zu veranlassen, eine vom 
Subjekt der Aussage gewünschte teleologische Setzung ihrerseits zu vollziehen’. 
8 Translation from German: ‚ein antwortendes Wesen’ 
9 Translation from German: ‚wechselseitigen dialektischen Polarität des Ideellen und des Reellen’. 
10 Translation from German: ‚realen Möglichkeiten im Ansichseienden’. 
11 Translation from German: ‚Je allgemeiner sich der Tauschwert verbreitet, desto deutlicher und 
bestimmter tritt als die ökonomische Fundierung seiner jeweiligen Größe die gesellschaftlich 
notwendige Arbeitszeit in den Mittelpunkt’. 





13 Translation from German: ‚Die Hauptfrage ist demnach, daß das Entstehen solcher Ideologien 
Gesellschaftsstrukturen voraussetzt, in denen verschiedene Gruppen und entgegengesetzte Interessen 
wirken und bestrebt sind, diese der Gesamtgesellschaft als deren allgemeines Interesse aufzudrängen. 
Kurz gefaßt: Entstehen und Verbreitung von Ideologien erscheint als das allgemeine Kennzeichen der 
Klassengesellschaften’. 
14 Translation from German: „allseitige Medium der Unmittelbarkeit’ 
15 Translation from German: ‚Im Alltagsleben des Arbeiters zeigt sich die Macht des Habens nicht 
mehr als ein einfaches Entbehren, als Einfluß des Nichthabens der wichtigsten Mittel zur alltäglich 
notwendigen Bedürfnisbefriedigung auf das normale Leben, sondern im Gegenteil als die des direkten 
Habens, als der Wettlauf mit anderen Menschen und Gruppen im Versuch, die persönliche Geltung 
durch Quantität und Qualität des Habens zu erhöhen’. 
16 Translation from German: ‚Die Wirkung auf den Menschen richtet sich also primär darauf, daß er 
des Glaubens sei, durch Erwerb der betreffenden Haarwässer, Krawatten, Zigaretten, Autos etc., durch 
Besuch bestimmter Badeorte etc. als echte, von seiner Umgebung anerkannte Persönlichkeit zu gelten. 
Nicht das Anpreisen der Waren ist also hier das Primäre, wie ursprünglich im annoncierenden 
Anpreisen, sondern das persönliche Prestige, das durch ihre Erwerbung für den Käufer erreicht werden 
soll. Dem liegt sozial gesehen eine Doppeltendenz zugrunde: einerseits die Absicht, die Menschen in 
bestimmter Richtung zu beeinflussen, zu formen (wieder sei an Hitlers These über den femininen 
Charakter der Massen erinnert), andererseits die, die Partikularität der Menschen hochzuzüchten, in 
ihnen die Einbildung zu verstärken, gerade diese auf dem Warenmarkt erworbene oberflächliche 
Differenzierung der Partikularität sei der alleinige Weg des Menschen, Persönlichkeit zu werden, d. h. 
persönliches Ansehen zu erringen’. 
17 https://www.facebook.com/FacebookUK/info, accessed on April 10, 2014.  
18 http://www.youtube.com/yt/about/en-GB/, accessed on April 10, 2014. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 https://about.twitter.com/company, accessed on April 10, 2014. 
20 http://instagram.com, accessed on April 10, 2014. 
21 https://www.tumblr.com/, accessed on April 10, 2014. 
22 http://corp.sina.com.cn/eng/sina_intr_eng.htm, accessed on April 9, 2014. 
23 Translation from German: ‚kann diese Entfremdung nur durch eine fundamentale ökonomisch-
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